

English translation of L'Humanite' series on Reinhard GEHLEN
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DATE: _____

FROM SHERMAN KENT

TO: C 7

One of the lovelies from your
office that I met at
your house the other
evening told me that she
had not heard of this
series. Here it is in
English. Sherman

Washington Representative
November 1966

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A SERIES OF ARTICLES ON REINHARD GOHLEN

Following is a translation of three articles by Alain Guerin and Jean Honsel on Reinhard Gehlen, entitled, "When the Shadow General Was Going to School," "A Croquet in the Alps and a Plane to Washington," and "This Man is Dangerous," in the French-language newspaper L'Humanité (Humanity), Paris, 22 June 1955, p. 3, 24 June, 1955, p. 2, and June 28, p. 2.

When the Shadow General Was Going to School

Let us first turn the pages of some newspaper. For the Zeitung of Zurich it is "a man without face"; for the Freitag it is "an invisible general"; for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung it is "the man with a thousand faces"; for Colomb it is "the most enigmatic and best-concealed man in history"; for the Westdeutsche Tageblatt of Dortmund it is "the Shadow General"; for Aux Accords it is "the king of espionage"; for Christ und Welt of Stuttgart it is "the man of whom nothing is known"; for the Münchner Tagesschau of 1954 it is "the secret phoenix of Germany"; for The City of New York it is "the doctor"; for the Allgemeine Zeitung of Berlin it is "the most dangerous man of the West"; for the Stockholm Tidningen it is "a strange chief of spies"; for the Daily Express of London it is "a Hitler general who now spies for dollars," etc.

Does this journalistic honors list define a man or does it proceed from a legend? To answer this question is one of the goals of this inquiry. A question among others which one, moreover, could pose in a different manner. Like this, for example: Has Reinhard Gehlen, the present President of the BND, known for the past 25 years an exceptional fate and is he now one of the last and most fanatical proselytes of the "cold war", one of the most dangerous revengers of Bonn, a man who can raise a grave provocation in this still explosive land of Germany? It is a question which requires its full scope, its full range when one knows that the BND is the Bundesnachrichtendienst, that is to say the Federal News Service of West Germany, the heritage organism which Jacques Bloch-Morhange called the war of German spies.

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manufacturers." (1)

An inquiry on Gehlen, therefore,

To be appraised in the ordinary practice of our times, this type of inquiry does not present many difficulties if one wants to avoid all infallibility. The men of the secret service practice intoxication, even indirect, and it is often difficult to distinguish the border between the lie and the truth. For that reason we propose to stick to the facts.

The first fact in the life of a man is his birth. Reinhard Gehlen was born in Erfurt in Thuringia on 3 April 1901 in the apartment occupied by his father at No. 63 Jägerstraße. Who was this father? He was an Oberleutnant (First Lieutenant) in the army of the Kaiser, Walther Gehlen, himself the son of a governmental counselor of the Prussian monarchy. And what mother? Katharina Margareta van Vaernewyck belonged to a small family of Flemish origin. Reinhard was the first son of the household. He was three years old when his younger brother Walter was born, a future Jurist.

The Gehlen family remained only a few years in Erfurt. In 1908, in fact, the Oberleutnant left the army and the family and installed himself on the banks of the Oder, in Breslau (the present Polish Wroclaw). In partnership with his father's uncle, his brother Max, a doctor of jurisprudence at the University of Leipzig, the Oberleutnant had purchased the Leipzig University Publishing House Ferdinand Hirt at Königstraße No. 1.

At the Breslau Gymnasium, Reinhard Gehlen received in 1918 the diploma equivalent to our baccalaureat. He is sixteen and a half years old. He spends his adolescence in a Germany militarily defeated and economically ruined. For other sons of the nobility and bourgeoisie, the war of 1914 - 1918 and its tragic results had been the occasion to open the eyes and to range themselves at the side of the working class. The young Reinhard did the opposite. He applauded with his family the bloody crushing of the Spartakist episode, and, faithful to the Prussian tradition of his ancestors, he chose the army profession in a Germany officially without an army.

His destiny is from now on outlined: As soon as he can,

(1) "The War Manufacturers -- German Spies -- 1918 - 1930." -- Paris, 1930.

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he becomes Fehnjenjunker (student officer) in the renaissant Reichswehr, where he is admitted on 20 April 1926, barely 16 years old.

Enterprise of the National Socialist Leader.

These endowments as man of war and a mind dedicated to the cult of revenge assured the young Gehlen a rapid and brilliant career, so much more remarkable as despite the expected violations of the Versailles Treaty, openings were rare in the German army. Thus, on 1 December 1926, he is appointed Leutnant (second lieutenant) and sent to the second battery of the Third Artillery Regiment in Schweidnitz (the present Polish city of Swidnica). The Third Artillery is an Ausbildungsgesamt (training regiment). This indicates illustrates the concern that now seems primordial for Reinhard Gehlen: to acquire the maximum military knowledge. He left Schweidnitz in 1936 to spend two years at the cavalry school in Hannover. He left there as Oberleutnant (first lieutenant).

From then on his rise continues. He is Hauptmann (captain) at 23, and in 1935 he is chosen as one of 30 officers who receive the title of Generalstabler (officer of the general staff).

Who chose these fifty officers? The Nazis, to whom who were in power for the past two years and who, by the way, on 16 March 1933, constituted a Wehrmacht already 88 divisions strong. It are still the Nazis who admit reinforcements to the Kriegsschule (war academy) they just have opened, violating once more the Versailles treaty.

It is true, as Julius Leder so excellently reported (1), that the entire family Gehlen got on excellently with the Hitlerites from the beginning. The Ferdinand Kirt publishing house had received the title "model Nationalist Socialist enterprise." The president of the "control committee for the protection of national Socialist writings" had written in the "National Socialist bibliography," the principal work of Reinhard's father, that when the young brother Walter Gehlen had supported a doctoral dissertation in Jurisprudence at the University of Berlin, it had been on the question whether a deputy should be responsible to his voters or whether, on the contrary, he should be

(1) In his book "Die graue Hand" (The Gray Hand) -- Berlin 1951.

concerned only about reasons of State.

Politically sure in the eyes of the Nazis, the young officer Reinhard Gehlen was it not less in those of the German Junkers. When he married on 10 September 1931 at Gleiwitz (the present Polish Gleiwitz), he had taken as wife Leyer Charlotte Agnes Helene von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, the daughter of Junkers whose properties even then bordered on Polish soil.

The Colonel Is Forty Years Old.

Now that he is warming the reverent emanation that distinguishes the officers of the general staff in the Third Reich, the run of honors for the son of the Breslau editor is unassisted.

He spends his eighteenth and nineteenth years as a cadet in Liegnitz (the present Polish city of Legnica) as adjutant-commander of the 18th Artillery Regiment, and he progresses as major at the general staff of the 213th Division of the 8th Military Region in the invasion of Poland.

In 1940, flung upon France, Reinhard Gehlen garners for the "lightning war" the career as specialist of the "Intelligence Bureau" (army intelligence officer), which he has undertaken under the protection of General Von Kanstein. He savors the pleasure of invading our country as a liaison officer. As the missions he circulates between the headquarters of Rommel von Brauchitsch, the army of von Bock and the "Panzer" of the Generals von Rundstedt and Guderian.

Already, however, Hitler prepared the war in the USSR. Successively Adjutant (aide-de-camp) of the Chief of the General Staff of the Land Army, Halder, then head of the "Intelligence" of the operational group, under orders of an officer who achieved later a certain celebrity, Hensinger, Reinhard Gehlen participates in the preparation of the aggression against the USSR, the Barbarossa Plan. He distinguishes himself and is decorated in the spring a decoration and a promotion. In June 1941 he is decorated with the Kriegsverdienstkreuz Roter Klasse mit Schwertern (Distinguished War Service Cross First Class with Swords) and on 1 July 1941 he is promoted to Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel).

During the first months of the "Russia campaign," Oberstleutnant Gehlen continues to be an "army intelligence" officer, that is to say, in charge of operational intelligence (in France the first bureau of the general staff), but his capacities

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will change very soon. In fact, General Franz Halder, who had been his patron since October 1940, has enmity with "Service 12" of his General Staff: the "Fremde Heere Ost" (Foreign Armies East). Commanded by an elderly colonel, Hennig, "Service 12" did not furnish the detailed information which the general staff of the 1st Land armies has the right to expect of his intelligence service. This dearth of "secrets" is particularly annoying when the Wehrmacht, first victorious, experiences in the East its first reverses.

In the spring of 1942, General Halder therefore discharges Hinzen from the direction of "Fremde Heere Ost." To replace him he chooses an officer of his general staff who just before the forty: Reinhard Gehlen, and promotes him on this occasion to the rank of Oberst (colonel).

Until now an "I-A" officer (operations), this man of the Frankfurter publisher becomes therefore an "I-C" officer (intelligence) (the equivalent of the 2nd Bureau in the French general staff). And at once, with a higher rank, he becomes responsible of a service including several hundred officers which stretches from Yugoslavia to the South of the Balkans, and which handles all the questions relating to the enemy No. 1 of the Nazis -- the Soviet Union.

The Money-bag Thieves.

Reinhard Gehlen understands at once the amplitude and interest of his new situation. Between the "Abwehr" (S. of the Admiral Cesaris), who gets winded and gets himself in the trap of his intrigues with some British and American agents and the S.D. (4) of Schellenberg, whose Machiavellism is sometimes hampered by the fanatical ardor of some Nazi leaders, the new chief of "Fremde Heere Ost" feels that here is a place to turn with once he conceives the project of a service uniquely dedicated to intelligence and anti-Soviet action. Anti-communism suits the sole rule of this service. It is logical that in therefore

(3) Accurately "Abwehr Ausland" (counter-espionage abroad) of the OKW (General Staff of the Land, Sea and Air Forces). Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was its head since 1939.

(4) Accurately SD fur das Ausland (security service abroad, or Amt VI (Sixth Bureau) of the NSDAP (Central Security Bureau of the Reich). Under the authority of the Informationschef of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, the SS chief Heydrich -- before his execution by the resistance in Prague -- and Kaltenbrunner have successively directed the SD. One gets an idea of the importance of the SD when one knows that its Amt IV (Fourth Bureau) was the Gestapo itself (Secret State Police).

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will obey the best anti-Communist of the time: Adolf Hitler, but he will nevertheless not let himself be restrained by the rules regarding the Hitlerian esborilla, nor, furthermore, by the intrigues of the various general staffs against him.

In the Russian tradition, he will seek his tools from the organization, in the "new order" of the Nazi bureaucracy, efficiency, and from both he will get their contempt on account of their desire for supremacy.

Totalitarianism mixed with the absence of scruples will allow him to practice in a "total war" total intelligence (political and military, scientific and economic, etc.) and in his struggle for subversion and provocation not to take into account the risk of espionage that requires that action and intelligence must be fully co-ordinated.

Such will be the service - it is essentially counter-revolutionary, this war machine must not disappear with the Hitler's birth: the Hitler Reichschrift, the Hitlerjugend, the Hitler Hitlerbund, and the Deutsches Reichs of Federal Germany, one or the other, be the fuel.

But let us not anticipate. We are still in 1944.

The manner in which Reinhard Gehlen profoundly reorganized and totally reorganized the service whose head he has become, comes into view in the comparison made by Julius Leder, between the French Heeres Ost and its homologues for the same front: French Heere West. Whereas the first will remain ineffective multiplied by ten and foredoomed in its actions, the American CIA, the second will remain a service of the highest staff, concerned especially with military operations and propaganda and very comparable with the French Douzième Bureau during the two wars. Gehlen "took new roads," Leder concludes. And so it all.

The new chief of French Heeres Ost received similar authority from his superiors "spectral powers" and the transfer of command and then of hundreds of young non-commissioned officers he had in his service. Young non-commissioned officers and all kinds of other professionals: chemists and geographers, economists and physiciants, linguists and policemen, forgers and physicians, printers and parachutists, etc.

Pretending friendship for Canaris, when in April 1944 he let him be executed without moving a finger, he also obtained from the chief of Abwehr the "cession" of a large part of his Ostabteilung (Eastern Section), this organism of thirty

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G. Colvin has written (6): "the incomparable Russian department of counter-espionage that Canaris had prepared." At the same time he creates and organizes a new corps, the Frontaufklärungstruppen (front reconnaissance troops) subdivided in regiments and companies, placed under the orders of specially-chosen "I C" officers. One of the first directives which gave his new troops when he sent them behind the Soviet lines -- by infiltration or by parachute -- was to assassinate a maximum of Red Army officers in order to steal their wallets.

The chief of Fremde Heere Ost ordered these wallet thefts even at a time when he worked out new missions for Gruppe II and Gruppe III of his service. While the 3d section from now on is to devote itself to the "liquidation of the partisans," the 2nd is to devote all its efforts to the interrogation of the prisoners of war. A center is organized for this purpose, the fort of Bözen, near Lötzien.

To this fort are brought officers and soldiers of the Red Army, "raided" by Gehlen's men from the various Soviet prisoner-of-war camps. The Oberst also gave his instructions for these "raids." Leaders of the Communist Party, civilians, scientists and artists must be specially searched for.

A Chalet in the Alps and a Plane to Washington.

Hundreds of Soviet war prisoners were interrogated each day at the Prussian fort of Bözen by the men of Gehlen's Gruppe II. (1)

-- Mix violence with sweetness! the chief of Fremde Heere Ost told his officers.

It would have been more correct to say: enticement and torture. A certain enticement was, in fact, the great concern of Reinhard Gehlen.

-- The instructions of the Führer for the conquest by force of the Russian land and its total exploitation as a German colony can only lead us to our destruction, he really

(6) In his book "Admiral Canaris, Chef des Geheimdienstes" (Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Secret Service), Vienna; Munich; Zurich, 1938.

(1) See in yesterday's *L'Humanité* the article on article of this inquiry "When the Shadow General came to the School."

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told his young officers. "We can conquer the Soviet system only if we succeed in making the mass of the Soviet population our ally..."

Certainly, this reflection of Gehlen might cause quite some remarks. To report it after the Hitlerian defeat (as was evidently done) at nourishing the veritable campaign was done by Gehlen himself, tending to present him as an "opponent" of Hitler, a silent ally, but not thinking less of the 20th of July "twentieth July," which he was not. Such a reflection no doubt, moreover, by its unreality ... but what we must note is here is a preoccupation that often carries the counter-spy mission over to espionage subversion.

From 1942 on, the chief of Heeres Geheime Dienst would like members of his service to be constantly concerned about recruitment... To recruit the Soviets is easy to order but difficult to execute. That is why Gehlen is not so particular about the quality of his recruits. The political adhesions of the "winning side" will be especially those sentenced by court martial liberated by the German advance, White Russian servants... spread up all over Europe and come deserters.

As neither this sort of recruitment nor corruption proves very successful, Gehlen also uses "psychological warfare" in the letter. He tried to reawaken nationalism and chauvinism in the territories occupied by the Nazis. He tried to generate the minorities, the Poles and the Ukrainians against the Jews. But were the results of these attempts, on which we cannot go into detail here because they were revealed by Gehlen later and he was "cold war" in Germany for the account of the Americans?

They contributed in an important way to the building up of the "Volksarmy" and the utilization of the "collaborators" of the O.U.N. (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). If the Polish Heeres Geheime Dienst was able to outfit a few thousand, with the German uniform, the millions of pamphlets it has printed and distributed in Russia did not have the anticipated result. Torture and assassination remained more successful.

"Cold Realism."

The prompt development of the espionage service should have been entrusted to him, certainly won Reinhard Gehlen a favor.

(2) As Jürgen Thorwald did in Die Zeit, Berlin, of 30 November 1966.

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more rapid advancement than he had had until then. The service in which he experiences this advancement confirms, moreover, what we have said earlier about the attempted poisoning. But constitutes the campaign tending to make the chief of the "Freie Ost" appear as the ally of the officers who on 20 July 1944 tried to kill Hitler and who after their failure were savagely executed. Gehlen suffered the counterstroke of 20 July, not golden. In the contrary. It was at this time that the members of the Wachracht had been purged and their organization was submitted to the approval of a political committee. It is known in the SS that the master of the espionage network in the East was successively promoted to Generalmajor (brigadier general) and then to Generalleutnant (general of a division). His promotions took place on 1 January 1944 and 1 August 1945. (3)

The committee we spoke about had expressed the opinion that Reinhard Gehlen was "without reproach and worthy of confidence." On 9 January 1945 he was personally rewarded by Hitler.

It will be understood that under these conditions the recruiting of the Nazi special services undertaken by Gehlen of defect, when Schellenberg had to double his forces in the Amt VIII and take over the rest of the disbanding SS, did not affect Gehlen. (4)

On the contrary, says Lucjan Wolnowski (3), the agent had acquired the habit to turn himself to Freude and, at the same time, to intelligence on the West European countries for analysis and synthesis. And at the end of March 1946, the leader of the social-democratic tendencies, Franz Inner Schmid, present in Lucerne, wrote:

"SS Reichsführer Müller and the chief of the service 'Freunde Freie Ost' had during the war the supreme control over all the West European offices of Germany."

(3) The last of these two promotions, the one to Generalleutnant, is often hushed up or even concealed in Western Germany. The reason is easy to understand. However, the proofs are numerous, including the edition of 26 July 1956 of the Nurnberger Archiv, devoted to Gehlen's biography (see S. 22). (4) As we explained in our previous article, the Amt VI was the SD für den Ausland (security service abroad) of the ASWA (Central Security Office of the Reich), of which Part IV was the well-known Gestapo.

(5) In July 1955 "Güting Frey" (see S. 22).

Wiesbaden, 1956.

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However, in 1944, Reinhard Gehlen is very much in doubt about the German victory, and, as Jürgen Thorwald notes (C), "at the latest in mid-1944, Gehlen began to collect his reports, documents, studies and archives on Russia in very far areas of the Bavarian Alps." Doubts. Thus -- and it may be learned it from numerous sources -- it was impossible for him to archive of "Freude-Litze Co." to have been destroyed.

While thus taking the precautions, Gehlen, who had prepared his retreat to the American side. He was, however, a "realist," who always prided himself as being a "dramatic drama of power," continue to act with caution. One must not compromise one's future in case "Adolf Hitler" should victory to Hitler. For that reason he prepared, with assistance of his "American operation" his "operation Verlust."

The "Verlust" plan for the "desperation."

It will be recalled that under the name of "Operation Verlust" and desperate, acting in small groups, there had been secret actions in Germany following the Hitlerian defeat of Stalingrad. While these fanatics pulled about here and there, in deep, dark chasms, were received with open arms by the British, Americans, etc., it was he who had conceived the action plan of the "Verlust" plan approved by Hitler and put into operation by the SS (SS-Gruppenführer (General of the SS Army Corps) Heinrich

To provide for this clandestine Germanic operation, Gehlen had drawn his inspiration from the Polish Home Guard movement. The British officer of the Intelligence Service, Major Trevor Roper, who interrogated Walter Schellenbach, Gehlen's following the capture by the Allies, reported (C, 1947) that he told us that during the days close to December 1945, Major General von Gehlen, who had worked the "Verlust" plan, was discussing the Polish clandestine movement, had worked out a detailed plan of German resistance on the same basis."

It is not far-fetched to believe that Gehlen obtained promotion to the rank of Generalleutnant to his satisfaction. However, with things developing as they did, Gehlen obviously devoted himself essentially to his "American operation," while the allied troops in the East and the West occupied Berlin.

(C) In Die Welt am Sonntag of 27 November, 1946. This publication is the Sunday edition of the largest newspaper in the right in western Germany, Die Welt, published in Bonn, 1946.

(7) In his book "The Last Days of Hitler," London 1947.

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successive offensives the ruins of the Third Reich.

Another eminent member of the intelligence hierarchy, Heinz Jäger, wrote (S): "When the Hitlerites set fire to Berlin in 1945, General Gehlen was able to flee to West Germany with the most important documents of his service. He had saved the most secret lists of German agents in the USA and in the neighboring countries to the West (...). He had also given to the organization created by Osterweis, Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich."

This "treasure," one may say, was voluminous: In fact, it concerned not simply to furnish the American services with intelligence and archives, but to continue with the organization of his espionage and subversion apparatus, Gehlen left all his dispositions so that his principal collaborators could escape the vengeance of defeat as he had done.

-- Go quietly and have the Americans take you prisoners, the chief of French forces Cst said to his officers on 17 July 1944. Numer (trusted men). Do not say anything, once you are taken. To speak, wait for our orders, for mine or those of my agents, collaborators.

At the same time, those who remained of the Gehlen military post transmitted to many families of Gehlen's agents, his advice to die "for the Führer, the people and the Fatherland" (not "death" nor the best cover? Especially scapulars, forged papers ...)

Financing with ... Cigarettes.

At first Gehlen and his staff sought refuge in a castle where bombs were stored, the "Geybach I," not far from Garmisch. From there, when all the records had been "declassified" (i.e., filmed in triplicate and classified in hermetically sealed containers), they went to a Bavarian Alpine area, where a vast chalet was waiting for them. According to Jost von Döring, (S) this Alpine place is called Blaubeuren; actually, the castle is Garmisch! (S) ...

In his Alpine chalet, Reinhard Gehlen experienced a short time of inactivity -- not more than a few weeks -- the only one of his career, and then he came down to Munich, to this small Bavarian town he met American officers. He planned

(S) In the Daily Telegraph of 17 March 1962.

(S) In his book "Die große Flucht" (The big flight), Berlin 1961.

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himself into their hands as a prisoner, declined to give his rank, and asked to be as quickly as possible a high-ranking agent of the intelligence. Thereupon "prisoner Gehlen" reported to the Intelligence Center of the Seventh US Army in Wiesbaden.

The contact thus established with the 1st (and last) C.I.C. (19) soon bore fruit. In June 1945, Professor Schorlemmer was already no longer a captive but an interlocutor. His records of the Freunde Heere that left their hideout behind the offices of the American headquarters at Wiesbaden, principal collaborators of the services came out in the news as the prison camp to join their chief. "I am leaving for Washington ..."

Thus, less than three months after the fall of Berlin, the head of the principal espionage service and the subversion of Hitler was received by Americans. At the same time, negotiations began between Reinhard Gehlen on the one hand and Professor Schuman Kent and Brigadier General Edward Gandy on the other.

Feeling that his interlocutors were lush, Gehlen, the chief (but still alive) of Freunde Heere got back and made conditions. The main ones were: To be employed by the U.S. as a contributing force in the US Services, but not to be employed with the aim to have a budget in dollars; but to be employed only with American top officials; to receive full guarantees that whenever an autonomous German Government would be established it would be subordinated to it and could no longer be used against the Americans; to have to furnish intelligence only on the Communists and the countries of the East, with the exception of any information susceptible to endanger the future of the American Government; finally, to be assured that all his former Nazi escape prosecution for war crimes and "denazification" in the litigation that was in progress at that time.

-- O.E., answered the Americans, and especially General Bill Donovan, the chief of the O.S.S.; Allen Dulles, the future head of the CIA, and General George V. Marshall, the head of "G-2" (18).

(10) Counter Intelligence Corps.

(11) Office of Strategic Services, the American Intelligence Service during the war and the successor of the present CIA.

(18) The American "G-2" is the equivalent of the German "I C" and of the French "Second Bureau," i.e. the name of the various general staffs charged with intelligence.

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Reinhard Gehlen was even presented to Major J. Hornig, the head of the FBI (13), another gourmet in West-Germany's capitals. The effective preparation of the Gehlen network within its new American setting was entrusted to a Major specializing in intelligence, a future CIA person like, for example, Becker (14). Financing began immediately in an unusual manner with 2,500,000 dollars from the very beginning, originally from Bertram Selmer (8), and indirectly with thousands of boxes of cigarettes, which the agents of the network sold at double prices on the black market.

How this soon led to the establishment of the Bildungsstaats Industrieverwertung (Utilization of Industry in Southern Germany).

III. This man is dangerous.

Sometimes "Doctor," sometimes "Dr. 30," sometimes "Dr. Doktor Schneider," etc. Reinhard Gehlen likes never to give his real name and also for his service. Thus, before the "Inperial" cover: "Gesellschaft Industrieverwertung (Utilization of Industry in Southern Germany), he became Paul Schäfer (15). In fact, he returned from Washington under the highest classification of his historical division of the US Army and installed himself at his network in Wiesbaden. He remained there until May 1949, a brief period. A testing period? Did the Americans want to verify the efficiency of a service that already cost them more than two billion former francs annually?

This and no. 1. In fact, on the one hand during the mentioned years were for Gehlen only a waiting period, long as the newspaper *Die Zeit* (2) of which says: He "had already in April 1947 the possibility to extend his secret service network to the East;" but, on the other hand, it is evident that the

(13) Federal Bureau of Investigations, part of the federal police, an important part of which follows activation of the same order of the FBI in France, but with a more pronounced McCarthyist orientation.

(14) Lothar Becker did not hesitate to take the stand in the Nuremberg trials, but without appearing among the American audience.

(1) See an yesterday's *Illustrating* the article of this inquiry: "A chief in the Alps and a spy in Washington."

(2) In its edition of 8 February 1952.

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The recuperation of the organization Freude Heute Ost and its de facto insertion in the US special services system had not taken place without causing some disturbance in the leading circles of the United States.

The liberals formed in the Roosevelt cabinet, a party for whom Nazism remained a historic villainy, can also be said to have believed in peace and friendship among the people when they opposed this illegal re-employment of a gang of Hitlerites who were criminals and/or their thuggish agents for ends that had a diabolical character did not escape them. But the future neo-Nazi-thyrist carried the day. "In the end," noted James W. Folsom, (3) "Gehlen's choice sanctioned a veering of American policy." It was the choice of the cold war.

With this first pre-emptive crossed, Reinhard Gehlen could inconquerably develop his organization in a most systematic manner. He was so successful that Washington was then informed by the master of the master of his dimensions -- master but also master -- Allen W. Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and placed by Truman at the head of the CIA, that this instrument of war preparation was born. (4)

From its Hauptverwaltung (General Management) at the Kaiserallee in Potsch, in the Munich suburbs, the so-called "Süddeutsche Industrieverwertung" (utilization of industry) in Southern Germany; therefore achieved from its establishment in 1942 a rapid progress:

Systematically using the commercial cover, Gehlen organized his network under the appearance of a vast commercial firm, with branches called Generalkontore (general representations), Bezirksvertretungen (district representations), Untervertretungen (subrepresentations), and Filialen (subsidiaries). This took place in Germany, while residencies (residences) were established abroad.

It should be mentioned that even when the Gehlen Service

(3) In die Welt am Sonntag of 27 November 1966.

(4) The "Central Intelligence Agency," of which it is known that it could be called the "invincible government" of the US and which, from the overthrow of Mossadegh (in Iran) and of Arbenz (in Guatemala) to the recent massacre in Indonesia and the incessant provocations against Cuba has shown that no warmongering activity is unknown to it.

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ceased to be the clandestine Suddeutsche Industriewerke group to become the official BID, the "commercial" veils having remained in existence and the type of organization was little modified. Geographically, even if the "Filialen" and the "Untervertretungen" often changed their seats, the "Kontrollvertretungen" remained in Stocking near Landshut, in fact even itself, in Hamburg, Darmstadt, Mueeldorf, Krefeld etc., were relatively fixed and the "Kreisverwaltungen" were also stable. Abroad, the "Ressidenturen" were permanent in the capitals and the networks-- according to the information of the country-- spread almost everywhere.

The "Purifying of the Chancellery"

We have seen that one of the conditions demanded by Goebbel in 1940 to the Americans for his re-appointment had been the necessity to fire for all the Nazis who had remained in his organization he wanted to continue. The reason for the public notoriety that former SS men were abounding in Fullach. It is estimated that of the 1,000 SS collaborators and the 12,000 agents of the OKW, 70% or 57% have come from Freie Heere Ost, the Alsace-Lorraine, Cetaris, and the "KC" Bureau of the Generalstab, formerly the Wehrmacht (OKW), while 25% or more than 4,000 from former members of Bureaus IV (Gestapo) and VI (SS-Amt) of Schellenberg or RSHA (SI).

Some "former" names should be cited which are still prominent or figured still recently among the members of the Hitler Service. These include the names of Franz-Josef Sixtus, SS Brigadeführer (SS Brigadier General); Paul Lautensack, SS Sturmbannführer (SS-Corporal); Fritz Schmidt, alias Michael Schulte, of the Leitstelle (directing office) of the OKW to in Kiel; of Franz Göring, alias Wilhelm Tiersch, alias Wilhelm Tobisch, SS Hauptsturmführer (SS Captain); Wilhelm Hötti, alias Walter Hagen, SS Sturmbandführer (SS Lieutenant); Lamquet, SS Standartenführer (SS Colonel); Bruno Kutschera, alias Eberhard Kastner, alias Krause, SS Officer.

The contributions light on some of these names by the author point out that Wilhelm Hötti was under Hitler the adjutant of Adolf Hitler; that Bruno Kutschera was the adjutant of Otto Skorzeny, and that Franz Schöldt distinguished himself during the massacre of the "Foreign workers camp" at Majdanek.

(S) The relations between the various secret services of the Hitlerian Germany were recalled in the final article of this investigation.

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Ott near Kiel, where 2,000 captives were killed by a bullet in the back of the neck, and also during the entombment of 6,000 deported persons on the vessel "Cap Sancon."

"One would have to cite still dozens of other examples just as exemplary... But this is not all. For it should also be noted that, by protecting them and by persuading them not to lose their lives, Reinhard Gehlen has contributed greatly between 1945 and the creation of the Bundeswehr a breeding-ground of militarism. Adolf Hitler, for example, exemplified by working first at Füllbach before experiencing the nice career that is known. And General Ernst Ferber, author of the NATO "standing group" in Washington until his retirement, etc.

Moreover, on 21 August 1945, Georges Pouchain, could write in Le Monde about Gehlen and his men: "Even before the first noise of the boots has resounded, even before the first hissing of a jet motor, the Federal Republic will be in existence, thanks to the Americans, of an intelligence or counter-intelligence service whose ramifications are extended throughout Eastern Europe and perhaps even the West."

Paris-Presse said the same one year later, on 21 August 1946: "The Federal Republic of Bonn inherits today a service polished by 13 years of uninterrupted labor, which constitutes a veritable corridor as the most dynamic anti-Communist intelligence network."

In fact, the transition of Reinhard Gehlen from the Americans to the official control of Bonn, his elevation to the rank of Ministerialdirektor and the headship of Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service), or BND, that has been given to his network were one of the first bridge-ports to German rearmament and took on the quality of a symbol. Konrad Adenauer, moreover, knew to appreciate Gehlen's value and often received him privately -- this Gehlen whom the Soviet writer V. Chernov (6) baptised "the Garling of the Chancellor."

The "Konzern" Paid.

The transition of Reinhard Gehlen from the Americans to the Bonn authorities took officially place in 1946. The word "transition" should be correctly understood. It is certain, in fact, that the BND continued to be associated with the CIA and to serve the designs of the warmongering American circles in

(6) The title of a book published in Moscow in 1962.

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Europe and elsewhere. However, Gehlen gained by this arrangement greater liberty and vaster means.

Since 1948, the head of the Fremde Heeres Ost service had joined a "council" section to his network. This section permits the principal Konzerns, the big trusts of the "Adenauer miracle" in Germany to use espionage and provocation on behalf of the Right Labor claims. For that reason, excellent relations developed between Reinhard Gehlen and men like Horst von Ahren, Robert Pfordtenges, Wilhelm Zangen, Hermann von Bismarck, Max Ilgner, etc. who was the biggest German banker on the West, a member of some thirty administrative councils; Eduard Ankers, another powerful banker, twenty administrative councils, a financial counselor of Adenauer, Zangen, Giesecke, chairman of the Mannesmann trust; von Siemens, director of the Siemens group, one billion marks of capital; Ilgner, the man with a reputation of trust at I.G. Farben.

When he wanted to profit from his transfers to the West to grow and multiply, Reinhard Gehlen did not in vain count on the good heart and the gratitude of these magnates. "The German industry has turned over ten million marks to the secret organization of Gehlen," wrote the Gesamtdeutsche Zeitung on 20 January 1956.

And since then, the manna has not stopped coming in and the coffers at Pullach, nor the domicile of Gehlen, situated in Berg, near Sternberg from being open to the members and lieutenants of the Konzerns. Direct subventions and very remunerative cover money offered to the numerous collaborators of the KGB arrived in this manner and furnished 50% of his budget for organization at Pullach. The other half is made up of official financing which, by official accounts, reached 50,160,000 marks in 1966, 45,000,000 in 1969, and 50,160,000 in 1970.

Such increases during the years of his buxom, financial and technical means led Gehlen to give more confidence to the BND, while continuing the lance head of the "cold war" in Berlin and the Federal Republic (2), the former chief of the Fremde Heeres Ost service (3) has been concerned during these

(2) Activities of provocation and aggression against the German Democratic Republic are and remain a constant concern of Gehlen. Statistics covering the period between 13 August 1961 and 31 July 1962 give a good illustration: 158 attacks and 236 cases of aggression against the border of the DDR; 426 tear-gas bombs dropped; 100 cases of border violations and 2,716 of shooting against the railway lines of the S-Bahn.

(3) Service of Foreign Armies East. See the preceding two articles.

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ten years with giving some sort of universal competence to his instrument of subversion and espionage.

Let us throw a rapid glance on some of these activities. The countries of the People's Democracies and the U.S.S.R. are, of course, the main subjects. But not only they, far from it, have to suffer from Gehlen's activities. Germany, Great Britain, Italy, numerous countries in Africa, Austria, the Left Bank of France and Egypt have during the past few years been plagued by the enterprises of the R.A.D.

Terror in Tyrol and Explosives at the Netherlands.

Who, as was revealed by a document found by the French services at NATO in July 1958, had ordered his agents to find the localities where explosives could be most effectively placed in the dikes of the Zuiderzee to inundate a part of Holland?

Who, as we said at that time, has actively aided in Germany itself the terrorists of the "Red Hand" against the Algerian patriots?

Who supports in Austria and Northern Italy the terrorist actions of the members of the Cultural Work of South Tyrol of the Edelweiss League, and of the Liberation Committee of Southern Tyrol (RAS)?

Who established contacts with former General Galan, the head of CIA, and gave him such aid against promises of privileges in case the subversion would have removed him to France?

Who uses systematically, as formerly the "Waffen SS" Army, all emigrant organizations to recruit agents and stir up trouble in the countries of origin?

Who has sent armed groups to Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and the Ukraine?

The answer to all these questions, to be sure, is: Reinhard Gehlen.

And this answer, coming after we have told about him since the beginning of this investigation, shows how dangerous this man is. Spy master, manufacturer of provocations, master of subversion, he is one of those who in Rome continue to dream of war.

Reinhard Gehlen is the Al-Fall, the base of espionage and all agents of the R.A.D., under all circumstances have precise instructions concerning this subject. Very precise instructions.

It will be necessary to speak of this again.